Daria Mitina | United Communist Party (Russia)
Dear Comrades,
First of all, I would like to extend my greetings to our Korean comrades and, through them, express my gratitude to the leadership of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and personally to the Supreme Leader Comrade Kim Jong Un for the invaluable assistance rendered to the Russian Federation in the sacred and holy cause of liberating the post-Soviet space from the Kyiv Nazi regime.
I use this term deliberately.
The Korean leadership understands this better than anyone else: we are indeed dealing with a resurgence of fascism.
Perhaps no one expected that it would raise its head again after so many decades, but nevertheless it was precisely the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and its leadership that recognized this as a recurrence of fascism—an attempt at its revival—which under no circumstances should we allow through our joint efforts.
We highly value this assistance and are deeply grateful for it.
As Comrade Kim Jong Un said, “We are in the same trench with Russia.”
And we are also in the same trench with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, with People’s Korea.
Seventy-three years ago, the Armistice Agreement was signed at Panmunjom, formalizing the division of the Korean Peninsula into two parts.
Today, as we analyze the ideology and motivations of the Korean leadership, we observe that the DPRK’s own understanding of its history has naturally evolved as external circumstances have changed.
What People’s Korea has never possessed is dogmatism, rigidity, or an attempt to remain frozen at a single historical point.
And this is by no means accidental.
Undoubtedly, at the end of the Korean War in 1953, the population of the Korean Peninsula constituted one divided nation—a nation forcibly divided during the Second World War.
In this respect, although any historical comparison is necessarily imperfect, one may nevertheless draw a certain parallel with the fate of the German people, who, having adopted different models of social organization and different political and economic systems, found themselves separated not only by a physical border but also by ideological and political boundaries.
In this regard, the destiny of the DPRK is quite unique.
It is no coincidence that during the first several decades following the division of the Korean nation, the Socialist Constitution of the DPRK contained a provision affirming the reunification of the Korean nation as a strategic objective of both the state and its leadership.
We know that the Socialist Constitution has also undergone revisions and amendments.
In the 2020s, the Constitution of the DPRK has probably undergone the most substantial changes in its history, particularly those endorsed by the Ninth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea this year.
What is the significance of this?
Why did the strategic objective change—from the reunification of the Korean nation to the recognition of the reality of division?
The provision concerning reunification was removed from the Constitution and from the legal framework of the DPRK.
None of this is accidental.
Unfortunately, throughout these decades the Republic of Korea represented a succession of imperialist dictatorships—extremely brutal on the one hand, and servile and subservient on the other, since it has pursued a thoroughly pro-American policy, a policy oriented toward the global hegemon, with a complete absence of independence.
Moreover, as we can see, virtually every South Korean administration has been characterized by extreme anti-communism, by the most radical forms of anti-communism, and by an intensely hostile attitude toward the leadership of the DPRK.
Even the occasional fluctuations represented by Kim Dae-jung or Moon Jae-in—one signed an agreement with the DPRK bearing the lofty title of a “Peace Agreement,” while the other paid a three-day visit to Pyongyang and managed to establish a certain level of communication with the DPRK leadership—were nothing more than fluctuations that did not change the fundamental reality.
They did not alter the deeply anti-communist and, in essence, anti-Korean rule of all these dictators, who moreover proved to be not only dictators but also criminal figures.
We know that only one South Korean president left office under favorable circumstances, whereas all the others departed in extremely unfavorable ways.
The latest example—the failed coup attempt by Yoon Suk Yeol, which put an end to his political career and deprived him of his freedom—reflects, like a drop of water reflecting the whole ocean, the entire course of South Korean politics over the decades.
I would like to draw your attention to the following point.
Previously, during the 1990s, when Russia itself remained only a fragment of the great Soviet state and had, to a certain extent, lost its sovereignty, the word “Korea” in the official Russian mass media was more commonly associated with South Korea, the Republic of Korea, while People’s Korea was referred to specifically as the “DPRK.”
Now, however, especially following the participation of our Korean brothers in the international mission in the Kursk Region—and, I would even say, beginning in 2022—the political rhetoric within Russia itself has changed.
Today, in the official Russian media, the word “Korea” refers specifically to People’s Korea, whereas the southern part is referred to as the “Republic of Korea” or “South Korea.”
We know that Koreans themselves use different names for the two states, but nevertheless this linguistic change has become part of the policy of the Russian Federation that we are witnessing here and now.
We fully understand the motivations of our Korean brothers, who over many decades have become convinced that attempts at peaceful coexistence and political cooperation with their southern neighbor have, unfortunately, led to no positive results.
Whether one likes it or not, this is the conclusion that the Korean people have reached after drawing this line.
And, in fact, this was articulated in the state decisions adopted by the Korean leadership.
Western propaganda, bourgeois and imperialist propaganda, calls the South Korean experience the “South Korean miracle,” but it keeps silent about the fact that, firstly, this miracle was achieved primarily through imperialist assistance from the North American imperialist power, and secondly, the miracle itself is quite questionable.
As was correctly noted in the academic report, South Korea reached the level of second-rate capitalism much later than its northern neighbor.
By the beginning of the 1990s, under Chun Doo-hwan in particular, when communist ideology was finally criminalized and stigmatized, it is clear that the communist movement and the Communist Party had already been banned under Syngman Rhee, by the occupying American administration.
Throughout this entire period, we witnessed only persecution of the left, of communists, of trade unions, and of students.
This was finally institutionalized in 1980, after the disgraceful events in Gwangju, when the South Korean regime brutally suppressed student demonstrations.
At that time, this shameful prohibition on the Communist Party and communist ideology appeared within the legal framework of the Republic of Korea.
This is important because today, when you travel through the Seoul subway and see beautiful neon advertisements, periodically a scrolling message appears stating that if someone discovers that their neighbor, friend, or workplace colleague communicates with communists, reads communist literature or newspapers, or attempts to establish any form of communication with the North, they must immediately report it to the authorities—to inform on them.
In other words, not only is the ideology prohibited by law, but this system of denunciation and mutual surveillance, built over decades, is also encouraged.
This fierce and fanatical anti-communist propaganda naturally prevented, and continues to prevent, the two systems from moving closer together.
Undoubtedly, Koreans are one people.
A nation is a concept that is rather socio-economic in nature and characteristic of a particular historical period.
Thus, in our specific case, the two systems cannot exist and coexist together.
The term “one nation—two systems,” unfortunately, has failed to be realized in practice.
Because when one part of a people is raised in a state of hysterical psychosis toward the other half of its own nation, it is obvious that no reunification is possible.
Only absorption is possible—in the case of South Korea—or a victory of the Socialist Revolution in the South, and then we would have an entirely different situation, an entirely different Korean Peninsula, and an entirely different political rhetoric.
Until this socialist transformation takes place, no mutual visits, no periods of warming, and no temporary improvements in relations between the two countries will resolve this fundamental problem.
Unfortunately, they will not solve this problem.
Therefore, we understand the decision of the Korean leadership.
We would like the Korean people to become united in the long-term historical perspective, but we fully understand the motivations of the Korean leadership that has made such a decision.
I was fortunate enough to visit the DPRK several times, the last time being in 2024, when this historic decision had already been made.
Korean comrades explained to us and presented us with unshakable, ironclad arguments in favor of such a choice.
We treat this choice with respect—with enormous respect—and we fully accept it.
Thank you for your attention.