Victor Alexeyevich Vaziulin
Presentation at the 1st World Congress of Philosophy, Heraklion, 24-28.5.2006. Published in “Марксизм и современность” 2006 № 4, and in “ΔΙΑΠΛΟΥΣ” № 14, Ιούνιος-Ιούλιος 2006.
Translated into Greek by Dimitrios Patelis. Translated into English by Spiros Patelis. Proof-read by Kostas Kalogeropoulos.
Morality and politics are two spheres of the life of society.
Society is a developing “organic” whole. The organic whole differs from the mechanical patchwork in that within the organic whole, the internal (and not the external) congruence is prevalent, the internal interaction of its sides, its spheres, and so on.
Fully developed internal interaction is an interaction in which the interacting aspects not only necessarily presuppose each other, but also give rise to each other as something else, as something different from each of them.
External interaction is an interaction in which the interacting sides do not transform each other, do not necessarily develop each other.
Society as a developing whole, in its past and present state, progresses through a series of stages. Similarly, during the diagnosis, in the reflective interpretation of society’s history, we can discern a series of stages.
There are three major eras in the diagnosis, in the reflection of society, of the whole past and present history of humanity. The first era is the era of the commixtured[1] perception of society (and not only of society, but also of nature). The most characteristic feature of this era was expressed by the greatest thinker of antiquity, Heraclitus: “Everything flows, and nothing remains the same”.
However, chaos prevailed in the process of diagnosing the universal movement, the universal change, although in this chaos there were “islands” of perceptions, and even concepts.
The second great era in terms of the perception of society and the diagnosis of nature, any kind of diagnosis in general, was the era of the dissection of individual things and objects, of their fragmentary study.
This has led to the dominance of analysis in the cognitive process.
The transition from the prevalence of the commixtured and chaotic cognitive process to the prevalence of the analytical cognitive process represented a major advancement in the development of the cognitive process in general, including the process of thinking.
During this period, however, an important historical limitation of the cognitive process and of thinking emerged: the absolutisation of analysis.
This limitation is due to the limitation of the development of society. As long as people could not determine the future of the development of society and of knowledge, of thinking, they regarded their present state of society and of knowledge, of thinking, as basically non transient.
This era, with its achievements and historical limitations, still persists today, although the conditions for the transition to the third era of the development of knowledge and thinking have already emerged and are developing. The third of the great eras of the development of knowledge and thinking, including the diagnosis and reflection of society, is a kind of return to the first era, but it takes place in the light of the achievements of the second, predominantly analytical era.
There is a “return” to perception, to the understanding that “everything flows”, but now on the basis of the study of separate things, separate objects. At the same time, it is necessary to overcome the historical limitations of one-dimensional analytical knowledge, while preserving its achievements.
In other words, the era of synthetic knowledge, of thinking based on the sum of the separate concrete sciences, is dawning and has already partially dawned, but has not yet prevailed. This knowledge, this way of thinking, will indeed contain analysis as its necessary “organic” moment[2], but an analysis without its absolutisation. This method of cognition, of thinking, is none other than the method of conscious modern dialectics. In this way, the internal link, the internal interaction in its unity with the external link, with the external interaction, is brought to the fore.
I approach the study of the interaction of morality and politics with the attitude of the conscious dialectical method of thinking, which is characteristic of the third of the aforementioned eras of the development of knowledge and thinking.[3]
In the light of this approach, the interaction between morality and politics has passed through a series of stages in the past and present history of humanity.
In fact, it is not only the one or the other manifestation of morality, the one or the other manifestation of politics, the one or the other manifestation of the interaction between morality and politics that changes, but also morality in itself, the very concept of morality in itself, politics in itself, the very concept of politics in itself, the interaction between morality and politics in itself, the very concept of the interaction between morality and politics in itself.
This does not mean, of course, that the universal moments are absent from everything we have listed. But universal moments are internally intertwined with the specific and the unitary.
* * *
Given that morality and politics are spheres, aspects of the life of society, it follows that an understanding of them and of their interaction depends necessarily on an understanding of society and its history. A fundamental condition, and indeed a decisive one for the direction of the entire past and present history of humanity, which emerged naturally from nature, was the need to satisfy those biological needs which are necessary for life (food, protection from adverse or dangerous conditions, defence against attack, and so on). As humans became more and more distinct from the rest of nature, from the rest of the animal world, they learned to use natural means, given by nature in a ready-made form, to satisfy their biologically necessary needs. Then they increasingly moved on to processed, we might say man-made, artificial means, to means of production per se, although the means of foraging [hunting, gathering, fishing, mining, extraction of minerals], in no way disappeared, but were preserved to one degree or another and are still preserved to this day.
With the development of the means of foraging and the means of production, human beings have been and are increasingly able to satisfy their biologically necessary needs. However, humanity has not yet reached such a level of development of the means of foraging and production as to be able to optimally satisfy the biologically necessary needs of all human beings, or at least of the majority of human beings. Therefore, throughout history, past and present, a struggle for survival, for biological existence, has been and is being waged among human beings.
The struggle for the satisfaction of biologically necessary needs inevitably presupposes the mutual separation of human beings. In the course of this struggle, various associations may arise in order to safeguard the possibilities of satisfying the biologically necessary needs of some human beings or to increase these possibilities at the expense of other human beings.
And since the possibilities of satisfying biologically necessary needs are primarily determined by the means of foraging and production (in the broad sense, this includes the conditions of foraging and production), it follows that the main element that determines the possibilities of satisfying biologically necessary needs is the disposition of the means of foraging and production.
It is the disposition of the means of foraging and production that is the main element for the sake of which individual human beings, or various associations of human beings, strive to satisfy their biologically necessary needs.
If the means of foraging and the means of production of a society do not allow the members of that society to secure more than the minimum necessary for their subsistence, then in that society the seizure/appropriation by any part of society of a share of those available [goods] which satisfy the biologically necessary needs will simply lead to the death of that society.
The existence of such groups, associations of a part of society which live partly or entirely through the seizure-appropriation of a part of the consumable objects of other people, becomes possible when the means of foraging and the means of production allow the acquisition of objects for consumption in excess of the minimum necessary for subsistence.
In the history of humanity, the period from the moment when the means of foraging and the means of production begin to permit the acquisition of objects for consumption in excess of the absolute minimum necessary for subsistence, to the moment when the means of foraging and the means of production permit the acquisition of objects for consumption sufficient for the optimal satisfaction of the biologically necessary needs of each member of society, is regarded as the period during which the biologically necessary needs are satisfied, but not satisfied in the optimal way. This is the period in which not only the struggle between individuals, but also the struggle between groups and associations for the necessary objects for consumption is necessary. During this period, the existence of separate individuals, groups and associations is necessary, which concentrate the distribution of the means of foraging and production in their own hands, depriving other individuals, other groups and associations of it, and thus living at the expense of these other individuals, other groups and associations.
Politics, as a relatively independent sphere, begins to become distinct when, and as long as, the means of production and foraging arise which are sufficient to provide objects of consumption beyond the absolute minimum necessary for subsistence. And it continues to exist as a relatively independent sphere, as politics per se, until society arrives at a system in which every one of its members has the real possibility of optimally satisfying their biologically necessary needs.
Until then, politics per se will continue to exist, and its crucial, fundamental and decisive question will be this: who and how will have the means of foraging and production at their disposal as long as the unequal (formally equal from the point of view of the law, but actually unequal) relation to the means of foraging and production of the various people, groups and other associations, is necessary. In other words, the fundamental question of politics per se, as a relatively independent sphere, is the question of the existence of private property in the means of foraging and production, a question which necessarily presupposes the existence of an unequal relation of all members of society to the distribution of the means of foraging and production, and therefore also to the distribution of the objects of consumption.
Since politics is the condensed expression of the human struggle for real opportunities, for the real means of satisfying their animalistic, biologically necessary needs, it follows that perceptions, thoughts, feelings, etc. of a social, purely human character are not the central element [within it]. Therefore, in the case of a grievance, in politics per se, the goal is achieved by any means. This is the politics of self-interest. And other conditions remaining unchanged, the more relentless the struggle for human survival, the more often and the more easily, more or less consciously, political goals are achieved by any means.
However, all of the above ceases to apply in full during the period of transition of society to such a stage, during which the possibilities for the transition to the optimal satisfaction of the biologically necessary needs of each member of society are being formed.
We can divide the whole history of humanity into two eras: the prehistory of the authentic history of humanity and the authentic history of humanity.
It is precisely the struggle for biological survival, the impossibility of foraging and producing the quantity and quality of conditions and objects of consumption necessary for the optimal satisfaction of the biological needs of all members of society, that characterises the prehistoric era of the authentic history of humanity. It is the development of foraging, and above all, of production, that constitutes over time the possibilities of transition to the authentic history of humanity. And during this transitional period, politics in itself changes accordingly. What then gradually comes to the fore, in contrast to earlier history, is not the conflict of interests, of radical, vital interests, but the achievement of their inner unity. And then politics itself, as a relatively separate sphere of social life, begins to disappear.
At present, of course, politics dominates in the form that corresponds to the prehistory of the authentically human history of humanity.
Throughout human history, people have felt the need for unity and, moreover, have consciously realised it to varying degrees.
Throughout the prehistory of the authentically human history, the dominant tendency has been to bring people together for the sake of satisfying their biological needs. This is either a more or less civilised animal bond (such as sex), or a bond between self-interested individuals who wish to achieve their own self-interest through association.
In its general form, the principle that human beings should behave as mutually isolated and mutually associated in order to satisfy their own self-interest has been formulated as an imperative: “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you”.
If we consider the meaning of this imperative, we can see that it expresses the relationship of equal exchange. And when this imperative is promoted as a universal principle of behaviour, it is nothing more than a reflection of the fact that commodity and monetary relations dominate in society.
In the field of exchange of commodities and money, people form bonds and relationships, they form a unity. But what kind of unity? What kind of relations? What kind of ties? The participants in the exchange of commodities and money are characterised by mutual isolation, both before and after the exchange. The only thing that interests each of them is their own need, while the one with whom they exchange is not interested in them per se, is not interested in them as human beings, but only in terms of whether and to what extent they can satisfy the need of the one with whom they exchange.
Therefore, this is indeed a union, a bond between human beings, but it is a union and a bond that are external to human beings, who are mutually bound by self-interest. If one of the transacting parties cannot satisfy the needs of the other with his money or his merchandise, the other becomes irrelevant, utterly useless to him.
* * *
In addition to the dominant tendency in the prehistory of humanity, from the very beginning of the existence of humanity, there has existed and continues to exist another tendency, which could be called, to a certain extent, an opposite tendency. This is the tendency of the existence and development of internal bonds, internal relations between human beings as a unified whole.
The preconditions for this tendency already exist in the animal world. Such a precondition is “altruism”. It manifests itself, for example, in the nurturing of initially vulnerable and helpless offspring and in protecting them from attack to the point where the individuals who are parents, put themselves in mortal danger, even to their deaths, to save their young. Here, it is not the life of the individual in question that comes to the fore, but the life of the species as an inner need of the individual animal. In such cases, it is clear that what plays the most important role in the behaviour of the individual is not its own survival as a separate individual, but the necessity, manifested in and through its behaviour, of maintaining the life of the species (genus) as a whole.
When that level of development has been reached in which production (and foraging) makes possible the orderly satisfaction of the needs (of the members of society), over and above the very indispensable minimum of resources for subsistence, a differentiation of the interactions of human beings into external and internal takes place. At the same time, a distinction is made between politics – as the distinct sphere of the predominantly external bonds between human beings (as the sphere of the predominantly external bond of human beings as human beings and as the predominantly external unity of human beings as human beings) – and morality, as the distinct sphere of the expression of the predominantly internal bonds between human beings.
Morality, in its capacity as a sphere relatively independent, among other things, of politics, can of course exist until the sphere of politics is relatively independent.
With the formation of humanity, the necessity of preserving the life of humanity, of humanity as a whole, is anything but extinguished. Moreover, the bond associated with this necessity constitutes the very inner bond of humanity as a whole.
The associations between people for the fulfilment of the necessary individual and specific [private], biologically necessary needs also constitute a certain unity of people, but [a unity that exists] through the external bond, through separation. It is a unity of the alienated that does not transcend alienation.
The inner bond, the inner unity of humanity as a whole, not only emerges primarily in its uniquely human historical form along with the emergence of humanity, but also continues to develop along with humanity, forming one of the necessary aspects of this development. The process of humanity’s conscious self-realisation takes place, to varying degrees and in varying forms, within morality, which over time has been distinguished as a relatively independent sphere.
Morality as a relatively self-contained sphere has arisen, exists and will continue to exist as long as there is a struggle between human beings for their biologically necessary needs, a struggle for their biological survival. And as long as the struggle for survival takes precedence over the need to preserve the life of humanity as an internally unified whole, there will be a tendency to subordinate morality to politics, to use morality to serve politics, to use morality in a duplicitous way, to use morality in a hypocritical way, to impose the morality of the dominant strata, groups and classes in society on other strata, groups and classes.
In the period of human struggle for survival, people are inevitably divided, alienated and unable to act (and consciously realise society) as an internally unified whole governed by themselves. The forces created by society appear to them as unknowable, alien and often terrible, threatening and destructive. A society that exists as a unified, internally connected whole is seen by people as something alien, unknowable, and so on.
The morality that corresponds to this society is perceived as having no real basis, either internally or externally; they are projected as something that is externally self-evident to human beings and, with a certain degree of abstraction, as something absolute. Similarly, all moral principles are perceived as absolute, as independent of the actual history of humanity. In fact, all moral principles are historical, since they contain in their inner unity both the historically universal and the historically specific and unitary.
Take, for example, the following principle or commandment: “Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.” (Mark 12:31). One might say: is there any other way, apart from this commandment, which can further promote the establishment of the inner bond between human beings?
But let us look at this formulation. The starting point here is self-love, that is, the starting point is the individual. Therefore, it presupposes that the individual, by definition and primarily, is not internally united with other human beings. That is the first element. Secondly, it is also through love, that the person is brought into in a relationship of equal exchange with the other person. How can one’s love for oneself be weighed and balanced against the love for one’s neighbour? Does not this principle reflect the world of exchange of equivalent commodities?
Morality will only be able to be realised as morality (as opposed to contemporary morality, which is to a considerable extent subordinated to politics, hypocritical, etc.) when and as long as internal unity dominates society, or, in other words, when society becomes fully an internally unified whole, when the struggle for survival has disappeared from the life of society. But then morality (and not only politics) will disappear. Morality, for the people of the future, will become something akin to fresh air, the presence of which they will not perceive. As long as this air exists, they will be breathing it continuously, without separating it to inhale it through different spheres.
At the present level of the development of production, it is becoming increasingly clear that if humanity does not reach its full degree of existence as an internally unified whole, if it does not make the transition to authentically human history, its death is inevitable.
Notes
[1] Translation of the ancient Greek term Σύγκρᾱσις, meaning “mixing together”
[2] A term originating from G. W. Hegel. An essential but partial aspect, a stage, a part of a whole.
[3] A more detailed elaboration of the above theoretical approach and methodology can be found in V.A. Vaziulin’s book “The Logic of History. Questions of Theory and Methodology”, which has not yet been translated into English. Apart from the original in Russian [Вазюлин В.А. – Логика истории. Вопросы теории и методологии], the book has also been translated into German: V. A. Vazjulin “Die Logik der Geschichte, Frage der Theorie und Methode”, and Greek (Β. Α. Βαζιούλιν «Η Λογική της Ιστορίας, Ζητήματα Θεωρίας και Μεθοδολογίας».
