Victor Alexeyevich Vaziulin
Contents
1. Introduction. Posing the Problem
2. The Methodology of Researching the Development of Society
3. Society as an “Organic” Whole
4. The Process of Historical Development of Society
5. In Place of a Conclusion
The previous content was published in the last issue.
2. The Methodology of Research of the Development of Society
The template for researching society at a certain historical stage of its development is the greatest work of Marxism-Leninism, Karl Marx’s Capital.
In Capital, Karl Marx not only brilliantly revealed the economic relations of the capitalist socio-economic formation, but also outlined, intertwined with political-economic material, the most profound scientific foundation of the materialist understanding of history and the systematic development of dialectical-materialist logic. “Now,” emphasised V. I. Lenin, “since the appearance of Capital―the materialist conception of history is no longer a hypothesis, but a scientifically proven proposition.”[1]. And F. Engels wrote: “The working out of the method which underlies K. Marx’s critique of political economy is, we think, a result hardly less significant than the basic materialist conception.”[2].
To understand what F. Engels means when speaking of the method developed by K. Marx, one should pay attention to another thought from the same work: “The purpose of a work like the one under review cannot simply be desultory criticism of separate sections of political economy or the discussion of one or another economic issue in isolation. On the contrary, it is from the beginning designed to give a systematic résumé of the whole complex of political economy and a coherent elaboration of the laws governing bourgeois production and bourgeois exchange. This elaboration is at the same time a comprehensive critique of economic literature, for economists are nothing but interpreters of and apologists for these laws.
Hardly any attempt has been made since Hegel’s death to set forth any branch of science in its specific inner coherence.”[3].
The object of scientific research in Capital is the capitalist socio-economic formation as an “organic whole” (K. Marx).
What is an organic whole? An organic whole is a whole primarily characterised by the internal interconnection, the internal interaction of its parts. If this whole is dissected into its constituent parts, its very essence disappears. For example, if we were to dissect any living organism into its constituent elements, parts, etc., life would be destroyed.
K. Marx’s approach to the capitalist socio-economic formation as an organic whole is fundamentally different from that of bourgeois economists.
Before K. Marx, economists viewed society primarily as a sum of isolated individuals, as a whole, the elements of which are mainly connected externally. An element (part, etc.) of such a whole, considered separately from other elements, largely retains its specificity.
The bourgeois political economy’s representation of the isolated individual, or the so-called “robinsonade,” grew out of private property. Private property alienates people from each other. In the grip of private property relations, people imagine man as an “atom,” as an isolated individual, and society as a mechanical aggregate of such individuals.
K. Marx, who practically and theoretically defended the interests of the class destined by the objective course of history to lead the struggle for public property, also emphasised internal interconnection, internal interaction in the field of methodology. This allowed him, in analysing private property, to explain the life of society and to understand private property itself as a social relation.
The object of research as an organic whole was already studied by Hegel. K. Marx’s position, however, differs fundamentally from Hegel’s views on the organic whole.
For Hegel, the organic whole appeared essentially as an exclusively spiritual product. In other words, the organic whole was imagined by him as not existing within objective reality, independently from thought. The representation, the thought of the organic whole, was in fact understood as detached from this reality.
As a result, the link with the soil on which and from which the representation of the true organic whole grows, has been severed. Naturally, in such a case, the thought of the organic whole (identified with the actual organic whole itself), as it was formed in the mind of the thinker, appears essentially unchanged.
Hegel’s methodology expresses the great thinker’s attempt to overcome the alienation of people from each other. However, this attempt was undertaken on the basis of preserving the existing, antagonistic society, and therefore the only way to overcome alienation was to overcome it in thought, in representation, i.e., detached from the actual overcoming of social antagonisms.
K. Marx, expressing the views of the consistently revolutionary class, the class leading the struggle of all working people against exploitation, the struggle for the abolition of the old, antagonistic society, in the field of methodology, firstly, strictly distinguished the real organic whole from its reflection in thought, and secondly, consistently viewed the organic whole in the process of its development.
Thus, K. Marx’s dialectical-materialist approach is internally united with a strictly defined practical political position. Moreover, the correct practical political position serves as a necessary basis for developing a true methodology.
However, the correct practical political position by itself does not automatically generate the correct methodology. The theoretical reflection of the real existing organic whole is very complex and is carried out through a process of developing contradictions.
What are the paths, ways, and means of reflecting the organic whole in the process of its development?
First, let us name them. The organic whole in the process of its development is reflected―if we speak in the most general terms―by the method of ascent from the abstract to the concrete, as well as through the unity of logical and historical consideration. Moreover, in our view, the mechanism of ascent from the abstract to the concrete consists in the interrelation of the categories of surface, essence, phenomenon, and reality.[4]
Where does the reflection of the organic whole begin? First, the necessary prerequisite for the reflection of the organic whole is its actual existence. The actually existing organic whole can be denoted by the term “real concrete.” The actually existing organic whole is initially reflected sensually, in live observation, perceived mainly directly, externally. The aspects of the object that come into view appear mainly as unrelated to each other; a holistic understanding of the object is almost absent. Familiarisation with individual aspects, etc. and their separate study, i.e., analysis, predominates.
It would be wrong, however, to say that only the perception and study of individual aspects of the object take place here. From the very beginning, people’s attention is drawn to this organic whole by some vital need. For example, the research of bourgeois economists was driven by the need to increase bourgeois wealth.
Wanting to understand the need and what can satisfy it, gives rise to an assumption about the object as a whole, outlining, at first very roughly, the boundaries of the object of interest. This assumption, the initial representation of the object under study, guides the analysis. The analysis generally proceeds, by random deviations, from the consideration of the more complex aspects of the object to its increasingly simpler aspects, until the simplest aspect of this organic whole is identified. It should be kept in mind that although the whole is given as is, the aspects of the object are mainly understood separately. For example, K. Marx describes the path that bourgeois political economy took at its inception: “When we consider a given country politico-economically, we begin with its population, its distribution among classes, town, country, the coast, the different branches of production, export and import, annual production and consumption, commodity prices etc. It seems to be correct to begin with the real and the concrete, with the real precondition, thus, to begin, in economics, with e.g. the population, which is the foundation and the subject of the entire social act of production. However, on closer examination this proves false. The population is an abstraction if I leave out, for example, the classes of which it is composed. These classes in turn are an empty phrase if I am not familiar with the elements on which they rest. E.g. wage labour, capital, etc. These latter in turn presuppose exchange, division of labour, prices, etc. For example, capital is nothing without wage labour, without value, money, price etc. Thus, if I were to begin with the population, this would be a chaotic conception [Vorstellung] of the whole, and I would then, by means of further determination, move analytically towards ever more simple concepts [Begriff], from the imagined concrete towards ever thinner abstractions until I had arrived at the simplest determinations. From there the journey would have to be retraced until I had finally arrived at the population again, but this time not as the chaotic conception of a whole, but as a rich totality of many determinations and relations”[5].
Thus, the cognition of the organic whole initially proceeds from a chaotic perception[6] of the whole, i.e., of the concrete, as it is given in perception, in live observation, to ever simpler definitions, until, finally, the simplest aspect (relation, etc.) of the whole is identified. On this path, analysis predominates. But even here, the path of cognition is contradictory. Analysis is taking place in unity with synthesis. The existence of a social need to know about this object, the assumptions about what it is, directs cognition and forces one to look for connections between the aspects being analysed. Nevertheless, initially, analysis still dominates.
This is the real initial path of cognition. Awareness of it, however, can also be one-sided. The predominance of analysis can obscure the presence of moments of synthesis in this process of cognition, and then the initial stage of cognition of the organic whole will appear as purely analytical. This was typical of the classics of bourgeois political economy[7].
What is the final point of this path of cognition from a chaotic perception of the whole?―The isolation of the simplest aspect, the simplest relation of the organic whole.
What is the simplest aspect (relation) if we define it in relation to the above path of cognition?―It is the limit of the dissection of the organic whole. Further dissection goes beyond the scope of this object. For example, the simplest relation of the capitalist economy is the commodity. The commodity has use-value and value. Value cannot be understood without understanding what use-value is. But use-value cannot be taken as the simplest relation when considering the capitalist economy, because value does not only exist under capitalism, and even then, it does not only exist in relation to commodities. If we take use-value as the simplest relation, the specificity of capitalism will be lost. In other words, the simplest aspect is the most abstract concept. Abstraction is a detachment. In determining the simplest aspect, the thinking subject achieves the maximum detachment from all other aspects of the object. Consequently, the considered path of cognition is the path from a chaotic perception of the whole to the simplest relation, aspect, from the sensory concrete to the abstract.
After the stage of cognition during which the organic whole was primarily dissected into separate aspects, which were mainly studied separately, and increasingly simpler aspects were identified, the next stage begins. At this stage, the main task is to determine the interconnection, unity, interaction of various aspects. Moreover, cognition moves mainly from the simplest aspect of the organic whole to its increasingly more complex aspects. This movement of cognition is called the ascent from the abstract to the concrete. The result of the ascent from the abstract to the concrete constitutes such a reflection of the actually existing organic whole, in which the aspects of the organic whole are understood not chaotically, not disconnected from each other, but in unity with each other. However, as already mentioned above, the very essence of the organic whole consists in the specific, distinctive unity of its various aspects. Consequently, at the stage of cognition when the ascent from the abstract to the concrete predominates, the main aim of research is to reveal the essence of the organic whole.
At the previous stage, the connection, when observed, appears mainly as a simple coexistence of the aspects of the object alongside one another or as their sequential succession, i.e., mainly as an external connection of the aspects.
At the stage of the ascent from the abstract to the concrete, the reflection of the internal connection, internal unity of the aspects predominates, i.e., of such a connection that each aspect becomes defined in its essence precisely because of its connection with other aspects of the organic whole.
The concrete, as a result, the final point of the ascent from the abstract to the concrete, is the unity (and mainly internal unity) of various diverse definitions of the object.
In the ascent from the abstract to the concrete, synthesis predominates. At the same time, just as at the first stage, analysis, though predominant, was carried out in unity with synthesis, so in the stage of ascent from the abstract to the concrete, synthesis, though predominant, is carried out in unity with analysis. Just as the establishment of the difference of individual aspects (i.e., analysis) is impossible without some similarity between them, so the establishment of the unity of aspects (i.e., synthesis) is impossible without the establishment of the difference between them. But the predominance of analysis or synthesis is possible. The spotlight of our conscience, so to speak, can illuminate either one or the other. Either the illuminated area contains the difference of the aspects, and their connection is in the shade, or, on the contrary, the unity of the aspects is illuminated, and their difference is in the shade.
Consequently, in one way or another, human thinking in both the first and second stages is carried out in the unity of these opposites―analysis and synthesis. Moreover, the stages themselves act as opposites in relation to each other: at the first stage, analysis predominates, and at the second stage―synthesis. In general―if we take the main line of the movement of cognition―the reflection of the organic whole is carried out in a spiral; first, an assumption about the object emerges, the object appears mainly as an undivided whole (although certain differences of aspects are already present here), then the aspects of the object are isolated and studied separately; finally, as it were, a return to the initial “holistic” representation of the object occurs, but rather on the basis of knowledge of its individual aspects and as the determination of the unity of internal relations of the aspects of the object.
The ascent from the abstract to the concrete represents the main stage in the reflection of the organic whole, because it is at this stage that the primary task becomes the revelation of the internal connections, the internal unity of the aspects of the organic whole, in other words, the totality of laws and regularities[8], the essence of the organic whole.
In the history of human cognition, there have been two most typical errors in relation to the stages of cognition described above. The actual process of cognition is very complex and difficult, and these mistakes can occur under certain conditions―although not in a developed form―even in individual cognition. Knowledge of the history and essence of errors is quite effective medicine against them.
The first typical error. The thinking subject perceives the movement from a chaotic perception of the whole, from the sensory concrete to the abstract in isolation from the ascent from the abstract to the concrete, perceives analysis in isolation from synthesis, and absolutises the movement from a chaotic perception of the whole, from the sensory concrete to the abstract, absolutises analysis. We have seen, however, that the first stage precedes the second and includes the second as a subordinated, undeveloped moment. Such an error, if consistently adhered to, leads to a disorderly, chaotic accumulation of knowledge, to gliding on the surface of objects, processes, to the denial of the essence, to the denial of internal, on the surface invisible connections of objects, processes. In its most pronounced form, such a position is inherent in the vulgar economists in the field of political economy, and in the positivists in the field of philosophy.
The second typical error. The ascent from the abstract to the concrete is detached from the opposite path of cognition, synthesis is detached from analysis, and the ascent from the abstract to the concrete is absolutised, synthesis is absolutised. This error in its most developed and consistent form, is represented in Hegel’s logic.
Hegel expressed many brilliant assumptions about the place and role of the method of the ascent from the abstract to the concrete in conscience, about its mechanism, etc. However, Hegel presented the ascent from the abstract to the concrete as the only way of forming knowledge and deprived the opposite path of cognition of any real cognitive significance.
What does this mean and where does it lead?
The movement from the sensory concrete to the abstract is the movement from live observation to thought, to concept, it is the process of comparing thoughts with sensory data, with how the real object is presented in live observation, it is the comparison of thoughts, concepts with facts.
To deprive the movement from the sensory concrete to the abstract of any real cognitive significance and to assert that only the ascent from the abstract to the concrete is real cognition, is to detach the path of thought from comparison with sensory data, with the data of live observation, with facts, is to recognise that the development of thought does not depend on the actual state of things.
In a more general form, this means that thought is detached from actual reality and is presented as merely self-generated. And that is nothing but idealism.
The consistent, dialectical materialist understanding of the method of the ascent from the abstract to the concrete necessarily includes the following moments.
First, the ascent from the abstract to the concrete is not a pure self-generation of thought in itself, but a reflection of the real organic whole, the real concrete.
The more developed the real concrete, the more developed, of course, the method of ascent from the abstract to the concrete can be. In the ascent from the abstract to the concrete, the essence, the internal connections of the organic whole are mainly reflected, and the reflection is carried out from the simplest relation of the organic whole to increasingly complex relations of that whole.
For the method of the ascent from the abstract to the concrete to become the dominant reflection of the organic whole, it is necessary for this whole to mature, for its aspects, its relations, to take shape. The simplest relation becomes truly the simplest relation of this organic whole when the remaining, more complex relations of this whole are formed.
Secondly. The correct application of the method of the ascent from the abstract to the concrete necessarily presupposes the preliminary realisation of the stage of the movement of cognition from a chaotic perception of the whole, from the sensory concrete to the abstract. This applies both to science as a whole and to the individual. Science, the object of which is this organic whole, must pass through the stage in which the movement of cognition from the sensory concrete to the abstract predominates. The thinking individual must be sufficiently developed so that in their cognition of this organic whole the method of ascent from the abstract to the concrete can become dominant. To do this they must also pass through the stage in their development where the movement of cognition from the sensory concrete to the abstract predominates.
Thirdly, both paths of the movement of cognition―from the sensory concrete to the abstract and from the abstract to the concrete―must always be taken in their unity, but at the same time, the predominance of one or the other at different stages of cognition should be noted.
Concluding the section devoted to the consideration of the method of the ascent from the abstract to the concrete, it seems appropriate to us, after its general characterisation, to return to the mechanism of this path of cognition, but now from a more rigorous, categorical point of view. Without such a characterisation, it is impossible to present the question of the relationship between the historical and the logical approach in a sufficiently precise and complete manner.
The mechanism of the ascent from the abstract to the concrete is more fully and rigorously revealed, in our view, in the interrelation, interconnection of the categories “surface,” “essence,” “phenomenon,” “reality.”
The term “surface” is used here to denote the level of understanding of an object that exists at the very beginning of its representation in thought. At this stage of thinking, the object appears primarily as something given directly.
Let us consider the universal moments of the representation in thought of two interacting aspects of an organic whole. Where does the representation begin? It begins with the representation of the aspect that appears on the surface of the object, directly grasped.
Thus, in Capital, K. Marx begins his study of the commodity with use-value, i.e., with that which first catches the eye. This aspect is primarily characterised in itself, independently of the other aspect interacting with it.
Then, the external connection between the first, superficial, external aspect and the other aspect is revealed. In Capital, for example, K. Marx shows that use-value serves as a bearer of value under certain conditions.
From establishing the external connection between the first and second aspects, thought moves on to the characterisation of the second, internal aspect in itself, considered independently of the first. In Capital, having examined the use-value of the commodity in itself and established its external connection with value, K. Marx proceeds to define value in itself, independently of use-value. The second, internal aspect of the interaction emerges as the essence of the interaction. Only at this level does the self-motion of the object begin to be understood. To reach the cognition of the essence of the object is to reach the reflection of its internal contradictions.
We have mentioned that the second aspect, the essence of the object, is now considered in itself, independently of the first aspect. This does not mean, however, that what we learned about the first aspect is completely forgotten. In the dialectical movement of thought, the previous path of cognition does not disappear entirely but is preserved in a sublated, transformed form. In the second aspect, the first is sublated, becoming a moment of the second. The essence of the object is contradictory: the object in its essence relates to itself as it would to another, external object.
After the essence has been defined in itself, thought embarks on the reverse path: from essence back to the surface. But now the surface appears differently, with other aspects and facets than before the essence was defined. Now, only those facets of the surface through which the essence “shines through” or manifests itself become interesting. This is the phenomenon of the essence of the object. In his analysis of the commodity, K. Marx, after first considering use-value in itself, then the external connection between use-value and value, and finally value in itself, expounds the theory of the forms of the manifestation of value, thus returning, as it were, to use-value, since value manifests itself only in the relations of the use-values of commodities.
Finally, the unity of phenomenon and essence, as well as the form of this unity, is specifically observed. The formed unity of phenomenon and essence is reality. It should be noted that the term “reality” is used here not in the senses of “actuality” “matter,” “realised possibility,” etc. It is important not to confuse these meanings with each other.
Thought moved from the way the object appeared on the surface to its depth, and then the movement became the opposite. In reflecting the reality of the object, thinking returned to the surface, but now to the surface understood on the basis of the essence, and therefore of other facets, moments of the surface.
Only on the path of considering the essence in itself and on the path of movement from the essence to the phenomenon and reality do the internal interconnections and relations become the object of special consideration. On the path from the surface to the essence, the analysis of the external connections and relationships comes to the fore.
However, it would be insufficient to say only this. Thought is constantly moving in opposite directions, realising itself as the unity of opposites. Even on the way from the surface to the essence, the opposite movement of thought is present as a subordinated moment, although it does not dominate. Thus, K. Marx defines use-value before value, bearing in mind its connection with value, although he does not yet consider this connection itself. In defining use-value per se, K. Marx abstracts from what generates need and how the given thing satisfies human need. He does not explain why he emphasises one thing and omits another. Only later, in the specific characterisation of commodity exchange, can the reader discover these reasons.
Consequently, thought moves both from the surface to the essence and from the essence to the surface, although the first path dominates. On the path from essence to phenomenon and reality, the situation changes to the exact opposite: the movement from the essence to the phenomenon and reality dominates, while the movement from the surface to the essence remains as a subordinated moment.
Mastering the theoretical representation of the organic whole must also be both a movement forward and a return, as it were, to material already mastered.
The method of the ascent from the abstract to the concrete is applicable to the extent that certain features of the developmental process have matured. In its classical, most complete form, the method of the ascent is the mental representation of the mature stage of the developmental process, which constitutes an organic whole.
The problem of the ascent from the abstract to the concrete, formulated in this way, turns out to be a problem of the historical and the logical, namely, the problem of the actual process of development (historical approach) and its representation in thought (logical approach).
The real organic whole develops.
The question arises: what are the stages of development of the real organic whole, and what stages of cognition are determined by them?
The organic whole does not form instantaneously. Initially, preconditions emerge, or, in other words, the beginning of the object. At this stage, the object itself does not yet exist. Thus, before the emergence of capitalism, pre-capitalist commodity-money relations emerge.
In the next stage, the object itself appears for the first time. This is the primary emergence of the given organic whole. For example, the primary emergence of capitalism is established with the appearance of the commodity “labour power.” Primary emergence means that the given organic whole, the given object, has emerged.
Then begins the transformation of the inherited system by the newly emerging organic whole, the system from which and on the basis of which it emerged. This is the process of formation of the new organic whole.
The completion of the transformation of the inherited basis by the emerging new organic whole represents the maturity of that new organic whole. At this stage, the contradictions leading to the transformation of the new whole into a different object become clearly apparent.
These are the main stages, steps of the progressive development of the object as an organic whole. They necessarily correspond to quite clearly defined stages of cognition.
The stages of development of an immature organic whole are predominantly reproduced through the movement from a chaotic perception of the whole, from the sensory concrete to the abstract, while the ascent from the abstract to the concrete plays a subordinated role. The situation changes to the exact opposite in the process of representing the mature organic whole: now the ascent from the abstract to the concrete dominates, while the movement from a chaotic perception of the whole, from the sensory concrete to the abstract, becomes a subordinated moment.
The maturity of the organic whole is a stage in the process of its development. The past is not fully preserved in the present, but it does not disappear entirely; it is preserved in the present in a transformed form. The present changes, develops, and thus, in one way or another, contains the seeds of the future, it is transforming into the future.
Therefore, according to Marxist understanding, the ascent from the abstract to the concrete must be such a representation of the existing stage of development, such a representation of the present, that it also represents the past and the future within the present.
The mature stage of the development of the organic whole is mentally represented through the movement of thought from the surface to the essence and from the essence to the phenomenon and reality of the organic whole. This movement of thought is not only a reproduction of the existing organic whole but also, at the same time, in a sublated form, the history of its formation.
In the movement of thought from the surface to the essence, the historical process of the formation of preconditions and the primary emergence of the given organic whole is represented in a sublated form, while in the movement from the essence to the phenomenon and reality, the process of transformation of the inherited basis by the newly emerged organic whole is considered in a transformed form. For example, in Capital, K. Marx first characterises the commodity, money, and the transformation of money into capital. Logically, this is the path from the surface of capital to its essence, but at the same time, the historical development of the preconditions of capital and its emergence is represented here in a sublated form.
The past is not only transformed but is preserved in the present in a transformed form. The present does not relate to the past in such a way that the past is completely deprived of its independence. This is how Hegel understood the relationship between the past and the present. Applied to the historical development of humanity, this meant that the past was deprived of any independent significance, but then the present became the goal of history. In the Marxist understanding, the past never completely and absolutely disappears in the present, just as the future is not entirely reducible to the present.
Therefore, in the mental representation of the mature organic whole, there must be three relatively independent spirals of thought, in which the present is reflected, as well as the past and the future, in their relative independence of existence within the present. In the logic of Capital, the surface of capital (commodity-money relations), the essence of capital (the production of surplus value), the phenomenon of capital (the circulation of capital), and the reality of capital (the forms of unity of the productive processes and the circulation of capital) are represented. In addition, there is a study of the surface, essence, and reality of the commodity, as well as a characterisation of the preconditions for the emergence of a new mode of production (quality, quantity, measures of the negation of capital-there is no essence etc., here, since the essence of the new communist mode of production has not yet emerged).
The correct solution to these problems allows one to understand the organic whole, so to speak, at its root. Such understanding is not an end in itself. It is necessary for the conscious, fundamental practical transformation of the object of research, to direct the development of the organic whole.
In the next section, we will attempt to show the possibilities of using the methodology briefly outlined above in the study of human society.
If society is an organic whole (and this will be discussed in the next chapter), then it must be studied using the method of the ascent from the abstract to the concrete, that is, beginning with the simplest relation and proceeding to more complex relations, beginning with the surface and proceeding to the essence, and so on.
Only the study of society through the method of ascent from the abstract to the concrete, and in the unity of logical and historical consideration, allows a consistent and deep revelation of the internal connections of the various aspects, the various spheres of the life of society. And this has enormous practical significance, since it serves as the necessary theoretical condition for directing the life of society as a whole.
The next piece of content will be published in future issues.
Notes
[1] Lenin, V.I. “What the “Friends of the People” Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats”, 1894
[2] Engels, F. Review to Karl Marx, “A Contribution to the Critique of Political economy”
[3] As above
[4] Vaziulin, V.A. “The Logic of “Capital” by K. Marx”, 1968
[5] Marx K., “Grundrisse, Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy”, 1857-61
[6] Translation note: Here we use the word “perception” when referring to sensory data, instead of the word “conception” used in the translation of the Grundrisse, above.
[7] It should be noted that Marx distinguished between the classical bourgeois political economists, who strove for a sober and precise investigation of bourgeois wealth, and the vulgar bourgeois economists, the shameless apologists of bourgeois society.
[8] Russian “закономерность”, German “Gesetzmäßigkeit”.
