Aleksandar Đenic | New Communist Party of Yugoslavia (Serbia)
This article was published in Cuba at the request of the Cuban comrades and has been posted in several parts on ‘The Platform’.
International Legitimacy of the Partisan Movement
At the Tehran Conference in 1943, the Allies decided to support only the Partisan movement. After a meeting between Tito and Šubaši큓 with Churchill in 1944, the British government recognized the Partisan movement as the only legitimate authority in Yugoslavia. Tito then traveled to Moscow, where he met with Stalin and agreed on joint action between the Red Army and the Partisan units in the liberation of Serbia. With this agreement, the Partisans gained international legitimacy as the sole leaders of the new Yugoslavia, as the USSR sought permission from the communist-controlled army to enter Yugoslav territory.
Post-War Yugoslavia
The Communists triumphed in Yugoslavia because they provided answers to the national and economic questions. They recognized the mood of the masses, who accepted the class dimension of the anti-fascist struggle and the socialist revolution. After the end of World War II, Yugoslavia was re-established, but now as a socialist federation led by the Communist Party. The monarchy was abolished. Yugoslavia was one of the most brutally affected countries by the war, with over a million casualties (along with a demographic loss of 1,685,000) out of 14 million people living there, of which around 300,000 were Partisans. In Yugoslavia, in addition to the fight against the occupiers and their collaborators, there was also a civil, ethnic, and class war. In war-torn Europe, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ) managed to organize the most massive uprising. Thanks to the strength and organization of the KPJ, the scale of the civil war and vengeance was significantly smaller. In addition to the anti-fascist struggle, the KPJ led the socialist revolution, which brought unprecedented progress in the history of our peoples.
Consequences and Postwar Emigration
Although many collaborators with the occupiers and Nazis escaped punishment under the protection of Western allies, they emigrated to various countries, including Argentina, Spain, West Germany, France, Great Britain, and Australia. The Ustaša emigration, which had killed hundreds of thousands of Serbs during the war (and had a camp for children), continued to carry out terrorist activities against Yugoslavia under the sponsorship of the CIA and the BND (intelligence service of Western Germany). To a lesser extent, the Chetniks, who were a monarchist movement and collaborators with the occupiers during World War II, also participated in these activities.
Socialist Construction between 1945–1948
In the first postwar elections of 1945, the People’s Front list, led by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ), won, while the opposition decided to boycott the elections. These elections had historical significance as they marked the first time women in Yugoslavia were allowed to vote. Over 90% of citizens participated, and more than 90% supported the list led by Josip Broz Tito, clearly indicating the mood of the people at that time.
Agreement with the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia’s Foreign Policy Orientation
On April 11, 1945, an agreement on friendship, mutual assistance, and postwar cooperation was signed between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. This agreement laid the foundation for Yugoslavia’s foreign policy, which relied on the principles of alliance in the antifascist coalition and orientation towards other socialist countries and the USSR. The KPJ was a member of the Cominform (which included parties from European countries where communists were in power, alongside the two largest western communist parties, the Communist Party of Italy and the Communist Party of France). Yugoslavia supported the revolution in Greece, and Greek communists had their autonomous area in Yugoslavia, specifically in northern Serbia.
The Balkan Federation and International Challenges
After the war, with the help of the Soviet Union, the creation of a Balkan Federation was considered, which would include Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Albania, with the possibility of including Greece if the partisans won the civil war. The idea of the Balkan Federation was a response to the desires of the Balkan peoples for integration, which would end the “divide and rule” policy and allow for sovereignty through a socialist system.
Tito actively worked on this project, and Yugoslavia supported the Greek partisans and the unification of Albania with Yugoslavia. Bulgaria proposed a confederation, while Yugoslavia wanted Bulgaria to become an equal republic within Yugoslavia. The USSR supported voluntary unification, but not “assimilation.” The biggest opponent to this plan was Great Britain, which supported counter-revolutionary forces in Greece and was prepared to confront the socialist countries of the Balkans if Balkan integration occurred, at a time when the USA had a monopoly on the atomic bomb.
The 1946 Constitution and the Structure of the New Yugoslavia
The Constitution of the Federative People’s Republic of Yugoslavia was adopted in 1946, and the new Yugoslavia was composed of six federal units: Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia, along with the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina and the Autonomous Region of Kosovo and Metohija (where Albanians form the majority). During this period, separate republican citizenships were created within the federation.
This constitution was inspired by the “Stalin’s” constitution, which shaped relations in the USSR, but it had certain specificities. While the USSR was a multinational federation based on ideology, Yugoslavia was a state of South Slavic peoples united in a supranational community. The criteria for forming federal units also differed―unlike the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia took historical circumstances into account, not just ethnic or national ones. Furthermore, Yugoslav republics had greater fiscal autonomy than republics in the USSR.
The Informbiro Resolution and the Split in the Communist World
The Informbiro Resolution, adopted on June 28, 1948, in Bucharest, was a pivotal moment in the ideological conflict between the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ) and the Soviet Union. The Informbiro, an international organization of communist parties, was founded in 1947. This resolution condemned the KPJ for its refusal to accept criticism from other communist organizations, which led to serious political consequences. As a result, the KPJ abandoned positions of proletarian internationalism and the international communist movement.
Withdrawal of Soviet Experts
Before the adoption of the resolution, relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union had already deteriorated. On May 18 and 19, 1948, the Soviet Union withdrew its civilian and military experts from Yugoslavia, further worsening the situation. This move was a clear signal of the growing rift between the two parties.
Criticism of the Informbiro Resolution
The resolution specifically criticized the Yugoslav communists for their implementation of collectivization in the countryside, a key aspect of socialist transformation. This marked the beginning of a deep split between the KPJ and the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (SKP(b)). Prior to the adoption of the resolution, the KPJ had expelled Sreten Žujovi큓 Crni and Andrija Hebrang from the Politburo for their opposition to the five-year plan for Yugoslavia’s development and their insistence on following Soviet principles.
Criticism of the KPJ by the Informbiro
The Informbiro analyzed the situation within the KPJ and concluded the following:
• Deviation from Marxism-Leninism: According to the Informbiro, the KPJ had deviated from the path of Marxism-Leninism, both in foreign policy and internal politics. The actions of Tito, Kardelj, and Đilas were particularly criticized, especially the rapprochement of Yugoslavia with the West.
• Hostile policy towards the Soviet Union: The KPJ spread anti-Soviet propaganda, discredited Soviet experts, and pursued a hostile policy towards the Soviet Union.
• Denial of class struggle: The KPJ ignored the growth of capitalism, particularly in the countryside, and neglected Lenin’s teachings on the peasantry.
• Bureaucratic regime: The party was governed by a bureaucratic regime, lacking democratic processes, which undermined its organizational integrity.
• Favoring the Popular Front: The KPJ diminished the role of the communist party, favoring the Popular Front, which weakened the political power of the working class.
• Refusal to correct mistakes: The Yugoslav leadership was unwilling to correct its mistakes and continued its anti-Soviet policy.
Conflicts within the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ)
During the period of conflict with the Informbiro (1948–1956), around 55,663 members of the KPJ (approximately 12% of the total membership) supported the internationalist line of the Informbiro. Additionally, 28,880 participants in the National Liberation War and 4,153 members of the Yugoslav Army adhered to the Informbiro Resolution. Among them were:
• 2,616 political officials
• 2 members of the Politburo of the KPJ Central Committee (Sreten Žujovi큓 and Andrija Hebrang)
• 8 members of the KPJ Central Committee
• 16 members of the Central Committees of the republican communist parties
• 50 members of district committees
• 733 members of municipal committees
Repressions Against the “Informbiro” Supporters
All “Informbiro” supporters were expelled from the party, and around 16,312 people were subjected to reprisals, including being imprisoned in concentration camps on the Adriatic islands of Goli Otok and Sveti Grgur. Among them were veterans of the Great October Socialist Revolution, founders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, Spanish fighters, and participants in the National Liberation War.
Yugoslavia and International Relations
In 1948, Yugoslavia rejected the international communist and workers’ movement, despite the logistical support of the Soviet Union and proletarian solidarity, which had helped the communists come to power. The conflict within the international communist movement benefited the United States and Western countries, which began to assist Yugoslavia. Many Yugoslav leaders later shifted towards open positions of liberalism, with one of the first being Milovan Đilas, a member of the Politburo, who advocated for civil democracy and publicly abandoned communist positions in 1953.
Greece and the Balkans
The ideological split between the Yugoslav and Soviet parties had serious consequences for the Greek partisans. In 1949, Yugoslavia closed its borders to Greek partisans and dissolved their camps, leading to the defeat of the partisan forces in Greece. Additionally, Yugoslavia’s relations with the socialist countries of the Balkans were severed, and negotiations regarding the Balkan Federation were halted.
Ideological Conflicts and Workers’ Self-Management: Yugoslavia in the 1950s
After the ideological conflict between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in 1948, the differences gradually increased. In this context, in 1950, the Workers’ Self-Management Law was adopted, marking the transition from a planned economy to a market economy. Workers’ self-management essentially denied the state’s role in managing the economy. Enterprises came under the control of worker collectives, who independently made decisions about key matters, such as the procurement of raw materials, production, prices, wages, and profit distribution. As a result, the Yugoslav economy gradually became a market-based one, and competition between enterprises emerged, leading to increased social differences and disparities between Yugoslav republics.
The essence of workers’ self-management was that enterprises were run by worker collectives, which acted independently and made key business decisions, such as procuring raw materials, determining the type and scope of production, setting product prices, creating payrolls, and distributing profits. Enterprises had the right to buy, sell, lease, and rent real estate.
The constitutional law of 1953 defined Yugoslavia as a “socialist democratic federal state of sovereign and equal nations.” Along with this change, a new provision was added to the Constitution, emphasizing that all power belonged to the working people, who became the new constitutive body alongside the sovereign nations. This period also revealed a contradiction within the Yugoslav leadership between federalists and confederalists, which marked the history of socialist Yugoslavia.
The shift in political course was evident in Yugoslavia’s actions within the United Nations, where it abstained on the U.S. resolution regarding Korea. Despite the revisionist course taken by Yugoslavia, it remained socialist, as the means of production were in the hands of the working class.
The Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (1952): A Turning Point in the Social and Political Development of Yugoslavia
The Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ) was held in Zagreb in 1952, at a crucial moment when Yugoslavia was in conflict with the Informbiro. This congress was of exceptional importance as it allowed for an assessment of the previous struggle against communists who remained internationalists.
At the congress, the basic direction for future social development was clearly defined, which was to be based on the principles of self-management. In addition, the congress proposed that the People’s Front be transformed into a united and active mass political organization called the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia (SSRNJ). Ultimately, the congress made the significant decision to rename the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. Although the justification for this change was sought in the classics of Marxism, the main reason was the desire to distinguish the name from other communist parties, while the union of the party with non-communist elements was essentially nonsensical.
Starting in March 1953, the government began the process of dissolving cooperatives and state agricultural combines, which had previously received favorable treatment. Within nine months, two-thirds of the farmers had abandoned the cooperative system, and the social share of land ownership dropped from 25% to 9%. Later, in the mid-1970s, state ownership of land reached about 24%. To mitigate the problem of landlessness among peasants, the government reduced the allowable size of private holdings from 25-35 hectares to 10 hectares of arable land, and this restriction remained in effect for over three decades. Additionally, the system of compulsory purchases and fixed advance taxes was abolished, encouraging farmers to procure and sell products through cooperatives. The specificity of Yugoslav socialism was that, along with Poland, Yugoslavia did not implement collectivization in the countryside, making it the only socialist practice in Europe. However, small private properties created the problem of uncultivated fertile land, making its efficient use more difficult due to further fragmentation after inheritance divisions. These property relations led to high unemployment in Yugoslavia, and the solution was found in opening borders, allowing for the mass departure of surplus labor, mainly to Germany, Switzerland, France, Austria, and Italy, through state employment agencies. In the 1960s, Yugoslavia faced problems with the healthcare workforce as medical professionals emigrated in large numbers. The shortage of doctors in rural areas became a serious issue that persists to this day. Thus, in 1981, 625,069 workers were employed temporarily abroad (48% from Serbia, 24% from Croatia, 21% from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 9% from Macedonia, 7% from Slovenia, and 2% from Montenegro).
Additionally, the Balkan Pact of 1953, officially known as the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, was a political-military agreement signed on February 28, 1953, in Ankara by three countries: the Kingdom of Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. This agreement was directed against the Soviet Union and provided for the establishment of a joint military headquarters for the three countries. At the time of the pact’s formation, Turkey and Greece were members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), while Yugoslavia was a non-aligned socialist state. Although Yugoslavia was not a formal NATO member, the Balkan Pact allowed it to indirectly connect with this military-political bloc. The establishment of the pact was completed with a military agreement in August 1954, when a treaty was signed in Bled. In October of the same year, Israel expressed interest in joining this alliance, believing that Yugoslavia could help improve relations between Egypt and Israel. However, Israel never joined the alliance. During the pact’s existence, the Yugoslav military doctrine was aligned with NATO standards, with a particular emphasis on aviation, while air defense was secondary. This strategic approach, favoring aviation, turned out to be a critical mistake during later events that led to the breakup of Yugoslavia. Before the pact was signed, in 1950, Yugoslavia began receiving U.S. military and technical aid, and could count on U.S. support in the event of a war with the USSR.
Yugoslavia Restores Relations with the USSR and the Eastern Bloc
After Nikita Khrushchev took over the leadership of the Soviet Party, Yugoslavia restored relations with the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. This included renewed economic cooperation with socialist countries in Europe and the dissolution of camps where sympathizers of the Informbiro were held. In 1956, Yugoslavia supported the Soviet Union in suppressing the counter-revolution in Hungary. Although Yugoslavia restored relations with the USSR, its trade with the European Community and the U.S. dominated until its breakup, followed by relations with the USSR and the Eastern Bloc, and finally with non-aligned countries.
The Non-Aligned Movement and Support for Decolonization
The first conference of the Non-Aligned Movement was held in Yugoslavia in 1961. The founding of the Non-Aligned Movement at that time was beneficial to the U.S., as it aimed to prevent newly decolonized countries from falling under the influence of the USSR. Despite many contradictions within the Non-Aligned Movement, it had significant emancipatory potential. Yugoslavia actively supported decolonization, providing logistical support to Algeria’s fight for independence, while France organized terrorist actions in collaboration with political imigrants against Yugoslavia as an act of revenge. After 1967, Yugoslavia broke diplomatic ties with Israel and supported the Palestinian struggle for independence. Additionally, hundreds of thousands of students from non-aligned countries studied in Yugoslavia, and by 1989/90, their number reached 4,000. Yugoslavia also helped develop infrastructure in these countries.
Tito condemned the U.S. aggression in Vietnam, and protests supporting the Vietnamese were organized in Yugoslavia, along with demonstrations following the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, which became some of the largest protests in the history of Belgrade.
Amendments to the Constitution of 1963
The 1963 Constitution was focused on decentralization and market liberalization, while the state was renamed the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The terms “state” were replaced with “social community” and “social-political community.” Yugoslavia became a “union of voluntarily united and equal nations” based on the power of the working people and self-management. The republics were granted greater authority, but the centralist approach remained dominant.
In 1968, students initiated mass demonstrations in Belgrade, calling the University the “Red University―Karl Marx.” They protested against growing social inequalities (“red bourgeoisie”) and demanded more socialism in Yugoslavia. Tito supported the students, and the minimum wage for workers was raised by 30%.
Rise of Nationalism: Demonstrations in Kosovo and the Croatian Spring
In 1968, large demonstrations by the Albanian population in Kosovo and Metohija began as student protests. After these protests, Albanians gained the right to education in their native language, and the province was renamed the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo. The Croatian Spring of 1971, also known as the MASPOK movement, was a nationalist and secessionist movement that demanded the exclusion of the Serbian language from use and the declaration of Croatia as a national state. MASPOK had the support of part of the Croatian communist leadership and the Ustaše (fascist) emigration. The movement was led by Savka Dabčevi큓-Kučar and Mika Tripalo, communist leaders in Croatia who established ties with the Ustaše emigration. Tito dealt with the nationalists in Croatia, and the following year, with the liberals in Serbia.
Decentralization and the 1974 Constitution
After the student demonstrations of 1968, there was a withdrawal of the state from governance throughout Europe. Yugoslavia introduced further decentralization with the 1974 Constitution. This constitution essentially turned the federation into a confederation, as the republics and autonomous provinces gained the right to veto federal decisions. The Constitution enabled the political strengthening of the republics, which reduced the centralized power of the federation and increased the statehood of the republics. This constitution was seen in the West as a step toward democratization of Yugoslavia, while the Soviet Union believed it would lead to its disintegration.
The League of Communists of Yugoslavia and Eurocommunism
Yugoslavia provided financial support to Eurocommunist parties, particularly the Communist Party of Italy (PCI), and in its ideological magazines, it wrote positively about their deviations, presenting them as an “autonomous” path to socialism. While these parties rejected revolutionary strategies in favor of an evolutionary approach―promoting peaceful coexistence through institutions as a method for achieving socialism―Yugoslavia still considered their path justified, even though the PCI openly supported NATO.
Yugoslavia After Tito
After the death of Josip Broz Tito, the party was taken over by a collective leadership. During this period, Yugoslavia gradually abandoned the principles of non-alignment, and during the Iran-Iraq war, it refused to condemn Iraq, as it was sourcing the majority of its oil from that country. At the same time, the country faced an ideological and economic crisis, partly caused by the repayment of debts to the IMF and the World Bank, which were incurred in the 1960s and 1970s. This period was also characterized by a rise in nationalism and social tensions.
In the 1980s, the United States, under President Ronald Reagan, launched a special war against Yugoslavia. The first concrete initiative was National Security Directive 54 from 1982, which called for support of the “silent revolution” in communist countries. Directive 133 from 1984 was specifically directed at Yugoslavia, and part of this special war involved economic sanctions. During this time, real wages in Yugoslavia decreased by 25% between 1979 and 1985.
Throughout the 1980s, the party and state were primarily led by technocrats who sought to transform Yugoslav society to resemble Western countries. Yugoslavia gradually moved closer to the European Community, which would later become the European Union. In 1988, the Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Budimir Lončar, informed the Presidency of the SFRY about the need to adapt to new integrative processes in Europe, with a special emphasis on the future transformation of the European Economic Community (EEC). It is important to note that the broader structure of the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs was pro-European, which was frequently reflected in public discourse in Yugoslavia.
In mid-1989, the Presidency of the SFRY issued a statement on the necessity of European integration. Later that year, the Federal Executive Council of the SFRY initiated negotiations for joining the European Economic Community. A significant contribution to maintaining Yugoslavia’s pro-European course in its last years (1989-1991) came from Federal Prime Minister Ante Markovi큓. As president of the Federal Executive Council, Markovi큓 tried to unite the political forces of Yugoslavia’s liberal orientation (the so-called Alliance of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia) to preserve Yugoslavia and its European path. Markovi큓 was known for his liberal reforms, privatization, and neoliberal policies, and the BBC referred to him as “the best American friend in Yugoslavia.”
The Process of the Distraction of Yugoslavia (1990-2000)
The counter-revolutionary processes in Eastern Europe had a significant impact on Yugoslavia, which was essentially a confederate state with a high degree of autonomy within its republics and autonomous provinces. Each of them sought greater political power, and in practice, there were eight political parties, with local organizations subordinated primarily to the authorities of their respective republics or provinces, rather than to the central government. In this environment, nationalism became a powerful tool for legitimizing the power of local leaderships in a multiethnic country. Instead of the idea of “brotherhood and unity”, promoted by the Yugoslav concept during socialism, local bureaucracies adopted nationalism as the new dominant ideology.
In Yugoslavia, as in many other Eastern European countries, there were no mass protests demanding the introduction of civil (bourgeois) democracy. Instead, it was the political elites who made the key decisions. Within Yugoslavia, there were three main political currents: liberal, conservative-nationalist, and socialist (the dominant socialist current supported the self-management system). However, it would not be accurate to claim that the 1974. Constitution was the primary cause of the breakup of Yugoslavia. It was followed by numerous other factors, both internal and external, including changes in international politics, the reorientation of security structures, and the counter-revolution in Eastern Europe, which indicated that the Yugoslav path to socialism, based on socialist self-management, was hybrid and had a limited lifespan. Practice confirms this, as today there is no political party, movement, or state that supports Yugoslav self-management.
The last attempt to preserve the unity of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) occurred at the 14th extraordinary congress in Belgrade in 1990, when sharp conflicts arose among the delegates. Delegates from Serbia, led by Slobodan Miloševi큓, advocated for the preservation of centralized unity, while delegates from Slovenia called for a looser federation. After a two-day debate, on January 22, 1990, Milan Kučan, the president of the League of Communists of Slovenia, left the congress with 106 Slovenian delegates, soon joined by delegates from the League of Communists of Croatia. This event marked the formal end of the political existence of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, which was a key moment in the process of the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, soon leading to a civil war.
One of the key factors that accelerated the breakup of Yugoslavia was American policy, which in November 1990 adopted a Public law that clearly showed the United States’ intention to encourage the distraction of Yugoslavia. The law included the suspension of all loans and aid to Yugoslavia, which had a devastating impact on the country that did not have a stable domestic currency. The law also required that any republic wishing to receive U.S. aid must separate from Yugoslavia and declare independence. Aid was granted only to those republics that adopted “democratic values” according to the American definition, which practically meant support for right-wing, ultra-nationalist, and fascist groups. The goal of this policy was to break Yugoslavia into underdeveloped, right-wing “banana republics” that would become privatized and deindustrialized.
Under political pressure, Yugoslavia passed a law on political parties, and each republic held separate elections. In Slovenia and Croatia, nationalist parties came to power, while in Bosnia and Herzegovina a coalition of nationalist parties of Serbs, Croats, and Muslims was formed. In Serbia and Montenegro, socialists, former communists, came to power, and in Macedonia, social democrats, also former communists.
Before the armed conflict broke out in Slovenia, on June 25, 1991, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker clearly warned Yugoslavia that the U.S. would not allow changes to republic borders and that the military should not be used against Slovenia and Croatia. Two days later, Slovenia and Croatia declared independence, followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia in 1992. Bloody conflicts erupted in Bosnia as Serbs rejected the idea of a unitary Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In contrast, the leaders of Slovenia were aware that they could attack the JNA (Yugoslav People’s Army) without fear of a serious response because they knew that the JNA would not use all its force. Although the JNA had strong military power, especially after transitioning to Soviet weaponry in the 1960s and developing a strong military industry, its weaponry strategy was problematic. The JNA lacked an adequate air defense system while investing large amounts of money in aviation. In contrast, in conflicts with NATO, the JNA had no chance. As Zhukov said after the bombing of Dresden: “He who cannot defend his sky cannot defend his independence.” Yugoslavia had a military doctrine similar to NATO’s, while the Soviet Union and other socialist countries invested in air defense.
In that context, the situation became clear: either the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) would intervene in Croatia and Slovenia, allowing NATO to take the initiative and likely determine the outcome, as in Libya, or a controlled civil war would ensue (which was the case), with the army retreating to territories that supported the JNA, or Yugoslavia would move towards liberalism. This is why the JNA withdrew its forces to territories with a predominantly Serbian population, as Serbs, the largest ethnic group in Yugoslavia, supported the preservation of a unified state. The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the earlier conflicts in Croatia after its recognition, were under the full control of the U.S. From the perspective of military resources, whether regarding the remaining JNA forces or the military formations it supported, the opponents would have been defeated if the U.S. had not intervened. A conflict with NATO became inevitable, which is why all military equipment was withdrawn to territories that supported the JNA.
Additionally, during the 1990s, Yugoslavia faced an economic crisis and international isolation. The economy experienced a drastic decline, industrial production fell by 80%, and inflation was at a daily rate of 62% between 1992 and 1994. The U.S., the EU, and Russia under Boris Yeltsin imposed sanctions, further worsening the situation. While many other Eastern European countries went through similar processes, Yugoslavia faced both sanctions and civil war, leading to even greater problems. The wars in Yugoslavia were directly influenced by the U.S., and the war ended when the U.S. decided through the Dayton Agreement in 1995, making Bosnia and Herzegovina a NATO-controlled protectorate.
The distruction of Yugoslavia was a tragic process, involving mass migrations, expulsions (more than 500,000 Serbs were expelled from Croatia), and over 125,000 killed. Particularly tragic was the period of bombing in Yugoslavia in 1999. During the NATO aggression over the situation in Kosovo and Metohija, thousands died, and there were long-term consequences, such as an increase in cancer cases due to the use of depleted uranium.
Afterward, the so called Kosovo Liberation Army activated in Kosovo and Metohija, supported by the U.S. and the EU, which became the pretext for NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999. Before the military aggression, a media campaign and demonization of the Serbian people, the Yugoslav state, and its leadership were in full swing. It was often claimed that the Yugoslav authorities and Serbs were violating human rights, killing innocent civilians, and that the international community (in essence, Western imperialism) needed to intervene (which, in practice, meant aggression). It was also fabricated that Serbian police in Račak allegedly killed innocent civilians, when those people were actually terrorists, which served as a justification for NATO bombing. This pattern of Western media activity is repeated around the world. During the 78 days of bombing, over 4,000 people were killed, and tens of thousands were injured. Long-term effects included an increase in cancer, leukemia, and lymphoma cases, as NATO used depleted uranium and cluster bombs. The war ended with the Kumanovo Agreement, leading to the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army from Kosovo, while international forces (NATO and Russia, which withdrew in 2004) arrived in the region. It is important to note that Kosovo and Metohija represent a strategically key point in the Balkans, where the U.S. built the Bondsteel base, which can accommodate up to 50,000 soldiers.
Thanks to the preserved combat strength of the Yugoslav People’s Army, Yugoslavia provided strong resistance to NATO and retained 95% of its military equipment. The most difficult period in the country’s history was survived thanks to the socialist industry and economy, which were prepared for special conditions. However, under external and internal pressures, the system began to disintegrate.
During the 1990s, the government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia made numerous concessions, opening space for non-governmental organizations and media controlled by the West. Large sums were invested in propaganda, particularly among the youth. Objective dissatisfaction due to the decline in living standards, wars, increased crime, high corruption, and the introduction of the private sector, which enriched a layer overnight, led many young people to become anti-communist and anti-leftist, often turning towards conservative and liberal propaganda.
Additionally, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia faced international isolation, including sanctions from the UN Security Council (1992–1995), as well as sanctions from the U.S. and the EU (1998–2000), and the country had no allies in the region due to objective circumstances. All of Yugoslavia’s assets were frozen or seized by Western countries. Nevertheless, over 80% of the income came from state-owned enterprises, and the country had to find ways to survive. At that time, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had a left-wing, patriotic, and anti-imperialist government, although Western propaganda tries to present that time as an era of nationalist and chauvinist domination, claiming that the wars in Yugoslavia were caused by Greater Serbian nationalism and Slobodan Miloševi큓. These contradictions allowed the counter-revolutionary process to be completed under external pressures. However, the entire process of the distruction of Yugoslavia was part of NATO’s eastward expansion and the attempt to prevent the creation of any alternative to liberal capitalism in the region.
The example of sanctions on Yugoslavia, Cuba, Venezuela, and other countries exposes the myth of the free market. According to that logic, the free market should regulate things on its own, and socialist societies are supposedly inefficient and doomed to collapse. However, a logical question arises: if the market regulates everything, why then do countries with “democratic systems” impose sanctions on these countries? This shows that the “free market” is actually defended by the protectionism of the most powerful imperialist countries, which want to preserve their monopolies.
